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Decentralized Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Joana Pais
  • Agnes Pinter
  • Robert F. Veszteg

Abstract

We report data from controlled laboratory experiments on two-sided matching markets in which participants interact in a decentralized way, without having to refer to a central clearinghouse. Our treatments have been designed to evaluate the effect of information, search costs, and binding agreements on the final outcome and also on the individual strategies that lead to it. We find that these features affect the level and pace of market activity as well as the identity of those who receive proposals. While the lack of information alone does not reduce stability or efficiency, its combination with search costs can be detrimental.

Suggested Citation

  • Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg, 2012. "Decentralized Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers Department of Economics 2012/08, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    • Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp082012
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Comola, Margherita & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2018. "An experimental study on decentralized networked markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 567-591.
    2. Thomas Gall & David Reinstein, 2020. "Losing face," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 164-190.
    3. Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2015. "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1-27.
    4. Péter Biró & Gethin Norman, 2013. "Analysis of stochastic matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1021-1040, November.
    5. Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey, 2015. "Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm," NBER Working Papers 21645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Agranov, M. & Elliott, M., 2017. "Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1743, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Experiments On Matching Markets: A Survey," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 153, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    9. repec:esx:essedp:769 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralized matching; experiments; stability; two-sided matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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