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Consumer driven market mechanisms to fight inequality: the case of CSR/product differentiation models with asymmetric information

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Becchetti

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

  • Luisa Giallonardo

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

  • Elisabetta Tessitore

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

Abstract

The bottom up pressure of "concerned" consumers and the rise of "socially responsible" products represents a new market mechanism to fight inequality and promote social inclusion. To analyze the new phenomenon of competition in corporate social responsibility (CSR) amid doubts on consumer tastes and of the effective corporate SR stance we adopt a horizontal differentiation approach in which the Hotelling segment is reinterpreted as the space of product SR characteristics and consumer tastes are uncertain. We find equilibria of the pure location and of the price-location games and show what changes when we move from a duopoly of profit maximizing producers to a mixed duopoly. Our findings illustrate that a nonzero degree of CSR is the optimal choice of profit maximizing corporations under reasonable parametric intervals of consumers’ "costs of ethical distance", corporate cost of CSR and uncertainty about consumer tastes.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Becchetti & Luisa Giallonardo & Elisabetta Tessitore, 2006. "Consumer driven market mechanisms to fight inequality: the case of CSR/product differentiation models with asymmetric information," Working Papers 50, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    • Handle: RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2006-50
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    File URL: http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2006-50.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0707, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Leonardo Becchetti & Massimo Cermelli, 2018. "Civil economy: definition and strategies for sustainable well-living," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 65(3), pages 329-357, September.
    3. Leonardo Becchetti & Marco Costantino, 2010. "Fair Trade in Italy: Too Much ‘Movement’ in the Shop?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 181-203, April.
    4. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2014. "Capacity choice in a duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm and an absolute profit-maximizing firm," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 105-117.
    5. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Private CSR Activities in Oligopolistic Markets: Is There Any Room for Regulation?," Working Papers 0816, University of Crete, Department of Economics.

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