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Debt Maturity: Does It Matter for Fiscal Space?

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  • Mr. Jun I Kim

Abstract

This paper examines how debt maturity affects the debt limit, defined as the maximum amount of debt a government can afford without defaulting. We develop a model where investors are risk neutral, the primary balance is stochastic but exogenous, and default occurs solely due to the government’s inability to pay. We find that debt limit is higher for long-term debt. Underlying this finding is the intrinsic advantage of long-term debt to price in future upside potential in fiscal outcomes in its current price. Such advantage makes long-term debt effectively cheaper than short-term debt at the margin, and leads to a higher debt limit. Simulation results suggest that the effect of debt maturity on debt limit could be substantial—particularly, if fiscal outcomes are subject to large uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Jun I Kim, 2015. "Debt Maturity: Does It Matter for Fiscal Space?," IMF Working Papers 2015/257, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2015/257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 117-125, September.
    2. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    3. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2009. "Debt Maturity: Is Long‐Term Debt Optimal?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 890-905, November.
    4. Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2019. "Slow Moving Debt Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3229-3263, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eidam, Frederik, 2020. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ESRB Working Paper Series 110, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Afonso, António & Tovar Jalles, João, 2017. "Sovereign debt composition and time-varying public finance sustainability," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 144-155.
    3. Eidam, Frederik, 2018. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles, 2017. "Sovereign Debt Effects and Composition: Evidence from Time-Varying Estimates," Working Papers Department of Economics 2017/03, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.

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