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Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage?

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  • Ms. Ana L Fostel
  • Mr. John Geanakoplos

Abstract

The literature on leverage until now shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become volatile in bad times. Together with the old literature this explains pro-cyclical leverage. The result also gives rationale to the pattern of volatility smiles observed in the stock options since 1987. Finally, the paper presents for the first time a dynamic model in which an asset is endogenously traded simultaneously at different margin requirements in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Ms. Ana L Fostel & Mr. John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage?," IMF Working Papers 2010/206, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2010/206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2012. "Tranching, CDS, and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 190-225, January.
    2. Matt Darst & Ehraz Refayet, 2017. "A Model of Endogenous Debt Maturity with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Augusto Hasman, 2013. "A Critical Review Of Contagion Risk In Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 978-995, December.

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