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Deleveraging After Lehman: Evidence From Reduced Rehypothecation

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  • James Aitken
  • Mr. Manmohan Singh

Abstract

Rehypothecation is the practice that allows collateral posted by, say, a hedge fund to their prime broker to be used again as collateral by that prime broker for its own funding. In the United Kingdom, such use of a customer’s assets by a prime broker can be for an unlimited amount of the customer’s assets. And moreover, there are no customer protection rules (such as in the United States under the Securities Act of 1933). The paper shows evidence that, following Lehman’s bankruptcy, the extent of rehypothecation has declined substantially, in part because investment firms fear losing collateral if their prime broker becomes insolvent. While less rehypothecation reduces counterparty risk in the system, it also reduces market liquidity.

Suggested Citation

  • James Aitken & Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2009. "Deleveraging After Lehman: Evidence From Reduced Rehypothecation," IMF Working Papers 2009/042, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2009/042
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    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=22785
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2009. "Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 600-605, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bottazzi, Jean-Marc & Luque, Jaime & Páscoa, Mário R., 2012. "Securities market theory: Possession, repo and rehypothecation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 477-500.
    2. Jaewon Choi & Or Shachar & Sean Seunghun Shin, 2019. "Dealer Liquidity Provision and the Breakdown of the Law of One Price: Evidence from the CDS–Bond Basis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4100-4122, September.
    3. William A. Allen & Richhild Moessner, 2011. "The international propagation of the financial crisis of 2008 and a comparison with 1931," BIS Working Papers 348, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Haircuts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(Nov), pages 507-520.
    5. Cyril Monnet, 2011. "Rehypothecation," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q4, pages 18-25.
    6. repec:cnb:ocpubc:fsr1314/3 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. James Aitken & Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2009. "Counterparty Risk, Impacton Collateral Flows and Role for Central Counterparties," IMF Working Papers 2009/173, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Park, Hyejin, 2021. "Collateral reuse, collateral mismatch, and financial crises," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 367-380.
    9. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Shadow Banking Regulation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 99-140, October.
    10. Lucas Marc Fuhrer & Basil Guggenheim & Silvio Schumacher, 2016. "Re‐Use of Collateral in the Repo Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(6), pages 1169-1193, September.
    11. Mesly, Olivier, 2023. "Irrational exuberance and deception — Why markets spin out of control," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    12. Mr. John Kiff & Ms. Jennifer A. Elliott & Mr. Elias G. Kazarian & Ms. Jodi G Scarlata & Carolyne Spackman, 2009. "Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy Options?," IMF Working Papers 2009/254, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Buschmann, Christian & Schmaltz, Christian, 2017. "Sovereign collateral as a Trojan Horse: Why do we need an LCR+," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 311-330.
    14. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Haircuts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(Nov), pages 507-520.
    15. Adam Kirk & James J. McAndrews & Parinitha Sastry & Phillip Weed, 2014. "Matching collateral supply and financing demands in dealer banks," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 127-151.
    16. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2013. "Securitization," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1-70, Elsevier.
    17. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky & Zoltan Pozsar, 2013. "Shadow banking," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 1-16.
      • Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky & Zoltan Pozsar, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    18. Aragon, George O. & Strahan, Philip E., 2012. "Hedge funds as liquidity providers: Evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 570-587.
    19. Rama Cont & Andreea Minca, 2016. "Credit default swaps and systemic risk," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 247(2), pages 523-547, December.
    20. Lisa Smack, 2016. "Catastrophe Bonds—Regulating a Growing Asset Class," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 105-125, March.
    21. George O. Aragon & Philip E. Strahan, 2009. "Hedge Funds as Liquidity Providers: Evidence from the Lehman Bankruptcy," NBER Working Papers 15336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Jean-Marc Bottazzi & Jaime Luque & Mário Páscoa, 2010. "Re-hypotecation of securities," Post-Print halshs-00476004, HAL.
    23. Matteo Accornero, 2020. "Collateral Re-use, Liquidity and Financial Stability," Working Papers 10/20, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.

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