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Modeling Two Macro Policy Instruments - Interest Rates and Aggregate Capital Requirements

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  • Hans Gersbach
  • Volker Hahn

Abstract

We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital requirement can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should be adjusted when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks but should not respond to demand shocks. Moreover, an optimal institutional structure is characterized as follows: First, monetary policy is delegated to an independent and conservative central banker. Second, setting aggregate bank-capital requirements is separated from monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2011. "Modeling Two Macro Policy Instruments - Interest Rates and Aggregate Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 3598, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3598
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker & Liu, Yulin, 2017. "Macroprudential Policy in the New Keynesian World," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168185, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Hans Gersbach, 2013. "Preventing Banking Crises--with Private Insurance?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 59(4), pages 609-627, December.
    3. Svatopluk Kapounek & Jitka Poměnková, 2012. "Liquidity supply and money velocity co-movements in the Eurozone - Time-Frequency Domain Approach," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 109-116.
    4. Friedrich L. Sell, 2012. "Some of the Pros and Cons of Central Banking Supervision by the ECB," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 40-45, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central banks; banking regulation; capital requirements; optimal monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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