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The Quest for Price Stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic

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  • Mr. Eric Parrado
  • Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of why inflation has not yet converged to price stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic and is currently relatively high by Latin American standards. It suggests that despite the institutional strengthening of monetary policy, important flaws remain in most central banks, in particular a lack of a clear policy mandate and little political autonomy, which are adversely affecting the consistency of policy implementation. Empirical analysis reveals that all central banks raise interest rates to curtail inflation but only some of them increase it sufficiently to effectively tackle inflation pressures. It also shows that some central banks care simultaneously about exchange rate stability. The potential policy conflict arising from a dual central bank mandate and the unpredictable policy response is probably undermining markets' confidence in central banks' commitment to price stability, thereby perpetuating an inflation bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Eric Parrado & Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome, 2007. "The Quest for Price Stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic," IMF Working Papers 2007/054, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2007/054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome & Mr. Francisco F. Vazquez, 2005. "Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 2005/075, International Monetary Fund.
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    4. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    5. Barry Eichengreen, 2006. "Can Emerging Markets Float? Should They Inflation Target?," Chapters, in: Matías Vernengo (ed.), Monetary Integration and Dollarization, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Agustín Carstens & Luis I. Jácome, 2005. "The 1990s Institutional Reform of Monetary Policy in Latin America," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 343, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    8. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    9. Mr. Markus Rodlauer & Mr. Alfred Schipke, 2005. "Central America: Global Integration and Regional Cooperation," IMF Occasional Papers 2005/005, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Mr. Eric Parrado, 2004. "Singapore's Unique Monetary Policy: How Does it Work?," IMF Working Papers 2004/010, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Mendieta Ossio, 2010. "The renaissance of Friedman hypothesis: nature of global financial crisis and consequences in a small open and highly dollarized economy," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 13(1), pages 119-151, December.
    2. Jalali-Naini , Ahmad R. & Hemmaty , Maryam, 2013. "Threshold Effects in the Monetary Policy Reaction Function: Evidence from Central Bank of Iran," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 8(1), pages 1-30, January.
    3. Ariadne M. Checo & Salomé Pradel & Francisco A. Ramírez, 2017. "The Effects of USA Monetary Policy on Central America and the Dominican Republic," Investigación Conjunta-Joint Research, in: Ángel Estrada García & Alberto Ortiz Bolaños (ed.), International Spillovers of Monetary Policy, edition 1, chapter 7, pages 189-222, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
    4. Julien Pinter, 2018. "Does Central Bank Financial Strength Really Matter for Inflation? The Key Role of the Fiscal Support," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 911-952, November.
    5. Luis F. Cernadas & E. René Aldazosa, 2011. "Estimación de una función de reacción para la política monetaria en Bolivia," Monetaria, CEMLA, vol. 0(1), pages 1-36, enero-mar.
    6. Åke Lönnberg & Mr. Peter Stella, 2008. "Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence," IMF Working Papers 2008/037, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Ms. Stephanie C Medina Cas & Mr. Alejandro Carrion-Menendez & Ms. Florencia Frantischek, 2011. "The Policy Interest-Rate Pass-Through in Central America," IMF Working Papers 2011/240, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Ake Lonnberg & Peter Stella, 2008. "Issues in central bank finance and independence," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2008-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

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