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A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime

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  • Ms. Yan M Sun

Abstract

Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelection.

Suggested Citation

  • Ms. Yan M Sun, 2002. "A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime," IMF Working Papers 2002/212, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/212
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
    2. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Spolaore, Enrico, 1994. "How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-140, September.
    3. Mr. Paolo Mauro & Miss Grace Juhn, 2002. "Long-Run Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes: A Simple Sensitivity Analysis," IMF Working Papers 2002/104, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Fiscal discipline and the choice of exchange rate regime," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 759-770, April.
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