IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/2001-055.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Transition Economies: How Appropriate is the Size and Scope of Government?

Author

Listed:
  • International Monetary Fund

Abstract

This paper assesses changes in the size and scope of government in 24 transition economies. Whereas these governments have retrenched in terms of public expenditures in relation to GDP, as well as public employment as a share of population, some indicators suggest that size remains high (e.g., rising indebtedness, a heavy regulatory burden, and prevalence of noncash transactions). At the same time, the scope of government activities-although evolving-has not necessarily become appropriate. This paper provides some recommendations for aligning the scope of government with the increasing market orientation of these economies.

Suggested Citation

  • International Monetary Fund, 2001. "Transition Economies: How Appropriate is the Size and Scope of Government?," IMF Working Papers 2001/055, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/055
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=4077
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. António Afonso & Christiane Nickel & Philipp C. Rother, 2006. "Fiscal Consolidations in the Central and Eastern European Countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 142(2), pages 402-421, July.
    2. Evelin, Ahermaa & Luigi, Bernardi, 2004. "Tax polici in new EU members: Estonia and othr Baltic states," MPRA Paper 18158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Miss Catriona Purfield, 2003. "Fiscal Adjustment in Transition Countries: Evidence From the 1990's," IMF Working Papers 2003/036, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Mr. Henri Lorie, 2003. "Priorities for Further Fiscal Reforms in the Commonwealth of Independent States," IMF Working Papers 2003/209, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Luigi, Bernardi & Mar, Chandler, 2004. "Main tax policy issues in the new members of Eu," MPRA Paper 18195, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Milan Žák & Petr Vymětal, 2006. "Institucionální aspekty nové komparativní ekonomie: ČR a EU [Institutional aspects of new comparative economy: Czech republic and European union]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(5), pages 583-609.
    7. Nikopour, Hesam & Shah Habibullah, Muzafar, 2010. "Shadow Economy and Poverty," MPRA Paper 23599, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Alam, Asad & Sundberg, Mark, 2002. "A decade of fiscal transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2835, The World Bank.
    9. Kristof Witte & Wim Moesen, 2010. "Sizing the government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 39-55, October.
    10. World Bank, 2003. "Serbia and Montenegro : Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Volume 2. Serbia," World Bank Publications - Reports 14823, The World Bank Group.
    11. World Bank, 2004. "Republic of Tunisia - Development Policy Review : Making Deeper Trade Integration Work for Growth and Jobs," World Bank Publications - Reports 15693, The World Bank Group.
    12. Margaret Grosh & Carlo del Ninno & Emil Tesliuc & Azedine Ouerghi, 2008. "For Protection and Promotion : The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6582.
    13. Alimi, R. Santos, 2014. "Does Optimal Government Size Exist for Developing Economies? The Case of Nigeria," MPRA Paper 56073, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anwar, Sajid, 2005. "Specialisation-based external economies, supply of primary factors and government size," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 259-271.
    2. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
    3. Lourdes Rojas Rubio, 2022. "Leader influence on Politics," THEMA Working Papers 2022-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Baraldi A. Laura, 2008. "Effects of Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Corruption on the Size and Composition of Government Consumption Spending: An Italian Regional Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-37, July.
    5. Perotti, Roberto & Kontopoulos, Yianos, 2002. "Fragmented fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 191-222, November.
    6. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and balances : an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 2117, Fedesarrollo.
    7. Pietro Tommasino, 2006. "The Political Economy of Investor Protection," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 604, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Wiberg, Magnus, 2011. "The Comparative Political Economy of Economic Geography," Research Papers in Economics 2011:21, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    9. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    10. Bellani, Luna & Scervini, Francesco, 2015. "Heterogeneous preferences and in-kind redistribution: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 196-219.
    11. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    12. Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 18, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    13. Marko Klašnja, 2008. "Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 55(2), pages 185-218, June.
    14. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
    15. William Roberts Clark & Matt Golder & Sona Nadenichek Golder, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 205-230, June.
    16. Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    17. Tyrefors Hinnerich, Björn, 2009. "Do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 721-728, June.
    18. M.Rosaria Alfano & A. Laura Baraldi, 2008. "The design of electoral rules and their impact on economic growth: the Italian case," Working Papers 3_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    19. Ignacio Lago-Peñas & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2009. "Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 85-98, January.
    20. Alfano, M. Rosaria & Baraldi, A. Laura & Cantabene, C., 2012. "Political Competition, Electoral System and Corruption: the Italian case," MPRA Paper 41480, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/055. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.