Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch?
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- International Monetary Fund, 1999. "United Kingdom: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 1999/044, International Monetary Fund.
- Anis Chowdhury, 2002. "DOES INFLATION AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? The relevance of the debate for Indonesia," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 20-34.
- Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- William Tompson, 1998. "The politics of central bank independence in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(7), pages 1157-1182.
- Hossein Samiei & Mr. Jan Kees Martijn, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom," IMF Working Papers 1999/170, International Monetary Fund.
- de Jong, Eelke, 2002. "Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 675-694, November.
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"Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?,"
Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
- Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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"Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September.
- Taylor, Mark & Sarno, Lucio, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective, and, If So, How Does It Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2690, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997.
"Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
- Prakash Loungani & Nathan Sheets, 1995. "Central bank independence, inflation and growth in transition economies," International Finance Discussion Papers 519, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Feldkord, Eva-Ulrike, 2005. "On the relevance of monetary aggregates in monetary policy models," HWWA Discussion Papers 317, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Nicoleta Bărbuță-Mișu & Tuna Can Güleç & Selim Duramaz & Florina Oana Virlanuta, 2020. "Determinants of Dollarization of Savings in the Turkish Economy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-16, July.
- Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
- Moïse Sidiropoulos & Blandine Zimmer, 2009. "Monetary Union Enlargement, Fiscal Policy, and Strategic Wage Setting," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 631-649, August.
- Pierre Faure, 2003. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Games and Effects of Institutional Differences between the European Union and the Rest of the World," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(5), pages 937-959.
- Feldkord, Eva-Ulrike, 2005. "On the Relevance of Monetary Aggregates in Monetary Policy Models," Discussion Paper Series 26343, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
- Michal Jurek & Pawel Marszalek, 2015. "Policy alternatives for the relationship between ECB monetary and financial policies and new member states," Working papers wpaper112, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
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Keywords
WP; inflation rate; government spending; Central Banking; Monetary Policy; Inflation; inflation aversion; equilibrium inflation; inflation expectation; inflation performance; inflation outcome; central bank bank charter; central bank place; inflation penalty; Central bank autonomy; Central bank mandate; Central bank organization;All these keywords.
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