IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/1994-135.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Treasury Bill Auctions: Issues and Uses

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Carlo Cottarelli
  • Mr. Leonardo Bartolini

Abstract

We review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Carlo Cottarelli & Mr. Leonardo Bartolini, 1994. "Treasury Bill Auctions: Issues and Uses," IMF Working Papers 1994/135, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1994/135
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=1283
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    2. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    3. Kondrát, Zsolt, 1996. "Az aukciós módszer hatása a kincstár bevételére [The impact of the auction method on the revenues of the Treasury]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 506-524.
    4. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023. "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    6. Mr. Jorge I Canales Kriljenko, 2004. "Foreign Exchange Market Organization in Selected Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey," IMF Working Papers 2004/004, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    8. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
    9. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    10. David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, "undated". "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    11. Kroszner, Randall S., 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," Working Papers 151, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    12. Elskamp, Rebecca, 2015. "Empirical Documentation of Bid Shading in the Discriminatory Auction," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205093, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Singh, Bhupal & Dhal, Sarat C., 1998. "Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India," MPRA Paper 12147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "A New Empirical Study of the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Is there more underpricing?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000206, David K. Levine.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1994/135. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.