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Minimum wage setting and standards of fairness

Author

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  • David A. Green

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of British Colombia)

  • Kathryn Harrison

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies)

Abstract

We examine the setting of minimum wages, arguing that they can best be understood as a reflection of voters' notions of fairness. We arrive at this conclusion through an empirical investigation of the implications of three models, considered in the context of policy setting by sub-units in a federation: a competing interests group model; a constrained altruism model; and a fairness based model. In the latter model, voters are interested in banning what they view to be unfair transactions, with the notion of fairness based on comparisons to the "going" unskilled wage. We use data on minimum wages set in the ten Canadian provinces from 1969 to 2005 to carry out the investigation. A key implication of the models that is borne out in the data is that minimum wages should be set as a positive function of the location of the unskilled wage distribution. Together, the results indicate that minimum wages are set according to a "fairness" standard and that this may exacerbate movements in inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • David A. Green & Kathryn Harrison, 2010. "Minimum wage setting and standards of fairness," IFS Working Papers W10/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:10/09
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    File URL: http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp1009.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chappell, Henry W. & Keech, William R., 1986. "Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 881-899, September.
    2. Jan K. Brueckner, 2003. "Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studies," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 26(2), pages 175-188, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Koichi Fukumura & Atsushi Yamagishi, 2020. "Minimum wage competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(6), pages 1557-1581, December.
    2. Braun Helge & Döhrn Roland & Krause Michael & Micheli Martin & Schmidt Torsten, 2020. "Macroeconomic Long-Run Effects of the German Minimum Wage when Labor Markets are Frictional," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 240(2-3), pages 351-386, April.
    3. Braun, Helge & Döhrn, Roland & Krause, Michael & Micheli, Martin & Schmidt, Torsten, 2020. "Macroeconomic Long-Run Effects of the German Minimum Wage when Labor Markets are Frictional," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 351-386.
    4. Kate Rybczynski & Anindya Sen, 2018. "Employment Effects Of The Minimum Wage: Panel Data Evidence From Canadian Provinces," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 116-135, January.
    5. Arindrajit Dube, 2019. "Minimum Wages and the Distribution of Family Incomes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 268-304, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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