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SubGame, set and match. Identifying Incentive Response in a Tournament

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Data from Association de Tennis Professionel (ATP) championship tennis tournament finals are used to test for strategic behavior of players and their responses to incentives. Tennis provides a rich environment for the study of incentive response because of the individual nature of the sport, and the clearly defined tournament structure. The parameters of a sequential game model are estimated and, controlling for measured ability differences, the existence of strategic decision making where players’ efforts vary depending on the state of the match is tested against the alternative that players do not alter their effort in response to incentives.

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  • Andrew J. Leach, 2003. "SubGame, set and match. Identifying Incentive Response in a Tournament," Cahiers de recherche 04-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    • Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0402
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    File URL: http://www.hec.ca/iea/cahiers/2004/iea0402_ale.pdf
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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Kenneth L. Judd, 1998. "Numerical Methods in Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262100711, December.
    3. Boulier, Bryan L. & Stekler, H. O., 1999. "Are sports seedings good predictors?: an evaluation," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 83-91, February.
    4. Christopher Ferrall & Anthony A. Smith, 1999. "A Sequential Game Model Of Sports Championship Series: Theory And Estimation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(4), pages 704-719, November.
    5. Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-179, April.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    7. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Craig A. Depken II & John M. Gandar & Dmitry A. Shapiro, 2022. "Set-level Strategic and Psychological Momentum in Best-of-three-set Professional Tennis Matches," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 23(5), pages 598-623, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tournaments; Sequential games; Incentive Response Nash Equilibrium.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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