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Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central

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  • Miguel Rueda

Abstract

Este documento estudia la relación entre el índice de riesgo de salida de un presidente de banco central y una medida de credibilidad en la política monetaria. El índice de riesgo de salida previsto se considera como una función de variables legales y políticas. La medida de credibilidad es la probabilidad prevista de un principio de deflación cuando la inflación está en aumento. En una muestra de 22 países latinoamericanos y del G7, se encuentra una relación negativa entre el índice de riesgo de salida y la medida de credibilidad. Los resultados demuestran que la independencia legal después de controlar el índice de riesgo de la salida del presidente no está asociada a aumentos de credibilidad.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," Research Department Publications 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4586
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