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Privatización en México

Author

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  • Alberto Chong
  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Durante los últimos 20 años, México ha redefinido el papel del Estado en su economía a través de un vigoroso programa de apertura del comercio, promoción de la eficiencia y reducción del tamaño y alcance del sector propiedad del Estado. La privatización condujo en México a una mejora significativa del desempeño del empresariado y la rentabilidad aumentó 24 puntos porcentuales, acercándose así a niveles comparables a los de las empresas privadas. Como máximo, cabe atribuir un 5% de ese aumento a un aumento de los precios y 31% a traspasos de trabajadores, mientras que el 64% restante representa incrementos de productividad. Hay elementos que indican que la privatización aporta otros beneficios sociales, tales como un mayor acceso a los servicios, que normalmente se producen a continuación de una privatización, y que conduce al mejoramiento de la asistencia social a los consumidores más pobres que compensan con creces cualquier aumento de los precios. Además, un aspecto de la privatización que se suele pasar por alto es el de sus efectos fiscales, en los que el producto de la venta se ve magnificado mediante la reducción de subsidios y el aumento de impuestos, y puede ayudar a pagar deuda o servir de fondos para el gasto social. El programa de privatización de México puede proporcionar una valiosa guía de lo que conviene y no conviene hacer en una privatización: En primer lugar, el proceso de privatización debe diseñarse cuidadosamente y ejecutarse de manera transparente. Hay requisitos especiales, tales como las prohibiciones de inversión extranjera directa o de pagos exclusivamente en efectivo, que conducen a descuentos considerables de los precios de las compañías vendidas, al tiempo que la simplicidad fomenta la competencia y conduce a precios más elevados. Además, un programa transparente puede contribuir a refrenar la tendencia de los políticos de favorecer a sus amigos mediante ajustes de las reglas del juego. En segundo lugar, la reestructuración de las empresas que se hallan en la antesala de su privatización resulta contraproducente para aumentar los precios netos de venta y por lo tanto se debe evitar. Los gobiernos invierten recursos considerables en inversiones políticamente motivadas o en programas de eficiencia que no son valorados por los postores y que rara vez se pueden justificar desde el punto de vista social desde el cual se promueven. Además, los programas de reestructuración alargan considerablemente el proceso de privatización y hacen bajar los precios de venta de las empresas; en el caso de México, cada mes de demora ocasiona una disminución de 2,2% del precio de venta. Por último, en este trabajo se sostiene que es fundamental desregular y volver a regular cuidadosamente a las empresas privatizadas, a fin de asegurar que se comporten adecuadamente, así como para proporcionar un marco de conducción empresarial que permita que las compañías financien sus operaciones sin depender de la ayuda del gobierno.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004. "Privatización en México," Research Department Publications 4374, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Chong & Virgilio Galdo & Máximo Torero, 2005. "Does Privatization Deliver? Access to Telephone Services and Household Income in Poor Rural Areas Using a Quasi-Natural Experiment in Peru," Research Department Publications 4417, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Felipe Barrera‐Osorio & Mauricio Olivera & Carlos Ospino, 2009. "Does Society Win or Lose as a Result of Privatization? The Case of Water Sector Privatization in Colombia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(304), pages 649-674, October.
    3. Jan Mattijs, 2007. "Belgique, terre de contrats: le contexte managérial, juridique et l'économie politique du mouvement de contractualisation en Belgique fédérale," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/14888, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. David K. Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2010. "The Brother-In-Law Effect," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 497-507, May.
    5. Sebastian Galiani & Martín González Rozada & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2007. "Expansiones de Agua en las Barriadas: Salud y Ahorros," Research Department Publications 3235, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2006. "Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 147, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    7. Sebastián Galiani and Federico Sturzenegger, "undated". "The Impact of Privatization on the Earnings of Restructured Workers," Business School Working Papers longterm, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    8. Mauricio Olivera & Felipe Barrera, 2007. "La sociedad gana o pierde como resultado de la privatizacion? El caso de Colombia," Research Department Publications 3231, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Sebastian Galiani & Martin Gonzalez‐Rozada & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2009. "Water Expansions in Shantytowns: Health and Savings," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(304), pages 607-622, October.
    10. Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, "undated". "Financial Dollarization and Debt Deflation Under a Currency Board: The Case of Argentina," DCBSLA Series 3, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    11. Estache, Antonio & Goicoechea, Ana & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2009. "Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 191-202, June.
    12. Alberto Chong & Virgilio Galdo & Máximo Torero, 2005. "¿Cumple la privatización lo que promete? El acceso a los servicios telefónicos y el ingreso familiar en zonas rurales pobres empleando un experimento cuasinatural en Perú," Research Department Publications 4418, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    13. Galdo, Virgilio & Chong, Alberto E., 2003. "Should State-Owned Firms Change CEOs before Privatization?: The Case of the Telecommunications Industry," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1453, Inter-American Development Bank.
    14. Galiani, Sebastian & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "Financial dollarization and debt deflation under a currency board," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 340-367, December.
    15. Parker, David & Kirkpatrick, Colin & Figueira-Theodorakopoulou, Catarina, 2008. "Infrastructure regulation and poverty reduction in developing countries: A review of the evidence and a research agenda," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 177-188, May.
    16. repec:kap:iaecre:v:13:y:2007:i:4:p:461-474 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Florencio López-de-Silanes, 1997. "Determinants of Privatization Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 965-1025.
    18. Alberto Chong & Virgilio Galdo, 2003. "¿Deben las empresas propiedad del Estado cambiar de presidente ejecutivo antes de una privatización? El caso de la industria de telecomunicaciones," Research Department Publications 4322, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    19. Aarón Garavito A. & Ana María Iregui & María Teresa Ramírez G., 2012. "Inversión Extranjera Directa en Colombia: Evolución reciente y marco normativo," Borradores de Economia 9655, Banco de la Republica.
    20. Pablo Egaña & Alejandro Micco, 2011. "Labor Market in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Missing Reform," Working Papers wp345, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

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