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Australian Loan Council: Arrangements and Experience with Bailouts

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  • Bhajan S. Grewal

Abstract

In most countries, public borrowing by subnational governments is subjected to somerestrictions imposed by the national governments. In a recent study of 53 selectedcountries, researchers at the International Monetary Fund found that all but six countriesimposed such restrictions. 1 Public borrowing by subnational governments was altogetherprohibited in 16 countries, while 19 countries did not allow subnational governments toborrow overseas. The controls in the remaining countries vary in detail and have beenclassified by the authors of the IMF study into the broad categories of administrativecontrols, rule-based controls and cooperative controls.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhajan S. Grewal, 2000. "Australian Loan Council: Arrangements and Experience with Bailouts," Research Department Publications 3098, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3098
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    File URL: http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=R-397&pub_file_name=pubR-397.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    2. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
    3. J. Bradford DeLong, 1998. "Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White, 1998. "The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bord98-1.
    5. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1996. "China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 149-185.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Fernández Llera & Carlos Monasterio Escudero, 2010. "¿Entre dos o entre todos? Examen y propuestas para la coordinación presupuestaria en España," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 195(4), pages 139-163, december.

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