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Inter-Regional Trade and Lobbying

Author

Listed:
  • Sergei Guriev

    (New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))

  • Evgeny Yakovlev

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

    (New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))

Abstract

In a federation, local policies with inter-regional spillovers depend on the extent and the nature of local capture. Local lobbyists who have multi-regional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests in a single region. In particular, multi-regional industrial groups lobby for lower interregional trade barriers than local industrial lobbies. The results are based on a simple model, case-study evidence, and econometric analysis of micro-level panel data from Russia. Controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the performance of firms increases with an increase in the number of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups. The paper has implications for international trade: lobbying by multinationals should lead to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergei Guriev & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Inter-Regional Trade and Lobbying," Working Papers w0100, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    • Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Russian federalism and post-Soviet integration: Divergence of development paths," MPRA Paper 12944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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