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Inequality Persistence and Policymaking Constraints: Explaining Regional Data Patterns

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  • Vlaicu, Razvan

Abstract

In well-functioning democracies, the policymaking process should in principle respond to persistent economic inequality with corrective policies. This process is set in motion through majority demands for redistributive taxation and spending that elected representatives eventually supply through policies designed to alleviate inequality. Policymaking constraints on both the demand side and the supply side have, however, considerably limited the extent of redistributive policies in Latin America. This paper explores recent data patterns from national and micro data to provide several potential explanations for the continuing high inequality observed in the region. Countries with stronger democracies have adopted more redistributive policies, even though post-tax inequality remains high in all of the region's democracies. Low citizen interpersonal and political trust both lead to fiscal policy preferences that constrain effective redistribution. Electoral participation has risen in the more democratic countries, while economically motivated protests have increased in weakly institutionalized settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Vlaicu, Razvan, 2024. "Inequality Persistence and Policymaking Constraints: Explaining Regional Data Patterns," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13546, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:13546
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0012973
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    policymaking; redistribution; Inequality; Trust; protests; Latin America;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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