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Municipal Consolidation and Local Government Behavior: Evidence from Japanese Voting Data on Merger Referenda

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  • Miyazaki, Takeshi

Abstract

The empirical literature investigating the role of key features of local governments regarding decisions on consolidation tends to use a dummy that takes 1 if adjacent local governments decide to merge. Under the estimation method, it is difficult to identify which governments have no incentive to merge. The current study presents an empirical test of decision on consolidation using voting data from Japanese local referenda that distinctively identify the preferences of specific individual municipalities. I find evidence that municipalities that could enjoy large economies of scale from a merger prefer consolidation, and large and small municipalities are likely to merge.

Suggested Citation

  • Miyazaki, Takeshi, 2013. "Municipal Consolidation and Local Government Behavior: Evidence from Japanese Voting Data on Merger Referenda," Discussion Paper Series 588, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:588
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/25675/DP588.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Miyazaki, 2014. "Municipal consolidation and local government behavior: evidence from Japanese voting data on merger referenda," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 387-410, November.
    2. Dino Rizzi & Michele Zanette, 2015. "A Procedure for the Ex-Ante Assessment of Compulsory Municipal Amalgamation Programs," Working Papers 2015:22, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Boundary reform; economics of scale; local referenda; median voter model; municipal consolidation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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