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Reluctant privatization

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  • Bortolotti, Bernardo
  • Faccio, Mara

Abstract

We study the evolution of the control structure for a large sample of privatized firms in OECD countries and find evidence broadly consistent with the concept of "reluctant privatization", defined as the transfer of ownership rights in State-owned enterprises without a corresponding transfer of control rights. Indeed, as of 2000, governments are the largest shareholder or use special control powers to retain voting control of 62.4% of privatized firms. However, contrary to accepted theory, greater government control over privatized firms does not negatively affect market valuation. In fact, government stakes are positively and significantly related to peer-adjusted market-to-book ratios. Results are not driven by the choice of the benchmark, reverse causality or by agency costs associated with private ownership. Rather, it appears that the relationship documented reflects more frequent financial aid (bailouts) accruing to privatized firms that remain under government control.

Suggested Citation

  • Bortolotti, Bernardo & Faccio, Mara, 2006. "Reluctant privatization," CEI Working Paper Series 2006-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2006-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Cavaliere & Simona Scabrosetti, 2008. "Privatization And Efficiency: From Principals And Agents To Political Economy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 685-710, September.
    2. Liao, Jing & Young, Martin, 2012. "The impact of residual government ownership in privatized firms: New evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 338-351.
    3. Cabeza-García, Laura & Gómez-Ansón, Silvia, 2011. "Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 412-430, September.
    4. Radygin, Alexander & Entov, Revold, 2013. ""Fundamental" theorem of privatization: ideology, evolution, practice," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 7-45, December.
    5. Omran, Mohammed, 2009. "Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 658-673, December.
    6. A. Cavaliere & M. Maggi & F. Stroffolini, 2017. "Investment-driven mixed firms: partial privatization by local governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(3), pages 459-483, June.
    7. Radygin, Alexander & Simachev, Yury & Entov, Revold, 2015. "The state-owned company: “State failure” or “market failure”?1," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 55-80.
    8. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, 2011. "Rozsah integrovaného státního vlastnictví a vliv firemní kontroly na výkonnost českých podniků [Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firm," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(1), pages 82-104.
    9. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Gao, Daniel N. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 424-448, June.
    10. Bernardo Bortolotti, 2005. "Political Institutions and Privatisation Policy," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(1), pages 12-18, 04.
    11. Evžen Kočenda & Jan Hanousek, 2012. "State ownership and control in the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 157-191, August.
    12. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    13. Chernykh, Lucy, 2008. "Ultimate ownership and control in Russia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 169-192, April.
    14. Alexander Radygin & Revold Entov, 2014. "The Fundamental Privatization Theorem: Ideology, Evolution, Practice," Working Papers 0087, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2014.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatization; Corporate Governance;

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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