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Corporate Governance and Investment in East Asian Firms: Empirical Analysis of Family-Controlled Firms

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Listed:
  • Hanazaki, Masaharu
  • 花崎, 正晴
  • ハナザキ, マサハル
  • Liu, Qun

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze in quantitative terms the influence of family control on the pattern of corporate investment, using firm-level data from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to regress the investment function and focusing on the family ownership structure that characterizes East Asian corporate governance. Our results present evidence that family-controlled firms, the majority of the firms in our data set, face more severe internal financing constraints than non-family-controlled firms. Our findings suggest that the mechanism in East Asian countries, which is commonly assumed to permit smooth reallocation of money among investment projects through the internal capital markets of family-controlled group firms, does not work well, and that, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining financing from external capital markets, it my lead to strict internal financing constraints on investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanazaki, Masaharu & 花崎, 正晴 & ハナザキ, マサハル & Liu, Qun, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Investment in East Asian Firms: Empirical Analysis of Family-Controlled Firms," CEI Working Paper Series 2006-12, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2006-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family-controlled firm; Corporate Investment; Asian crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East

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