Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Mixed Taxation
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Cited by:
- Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015.
"Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-119.
- Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, "undated". "Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and No Commitment," Discussion Papers 11/16, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2014. "Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and No Commitment," Working Papers 201415, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2011. "Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 54-57, October.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2010. "Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Health Care," HUI Working Papers 41, HUI Research.
- Carlos Bethencourt & Lars Kunze, 2017.
"Temptation and the efficient taxation of education and labor,"
Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 986-1000, November.
- Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2016. "Temptation and the efficient taxation of education and labor," MPRA Paper 75141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Thomas Aronsson & David Granlund, 2014. "Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Private Goods," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(2), pages 169-199, June.
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Keywords
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting; asymmetric information; income taxation; commodity taxation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-08-22 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-PUB-2009-08-22 (Public Finance)
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