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Temptation and the efficient taxation of education and labor

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  • Carlos Bethencourt
  • Lars Kunze

Abstract

This paper studies efficient tax policies in Ramsey’s tradition when consumers face temptation and self control problems in inter-temporal decision making. We embed the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a simple two-period life-cycle model and show that education should be effectively subsidized if the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education and if temptation problems are sufficiently severe. By contrast, if temptation problems are not sufficiently severe, efficient education policy calls for taxing education. Moreover, efficient labor taxation calls for subsidizing qualified labor if the strength of temptation is sufficiently large.
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Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Bethencourt & Lars Kunze, 2017. "Temptation and the efficient taxation of education and labor," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 986-1000, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:68:y:2017:i:4:p:986-1000
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Arvaniti & Tomas Sjögren, 2020. "Temptation in Consumption and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 20/339, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Arvaniti, Maria & Sjögren, Tomas, 2023. "Temptation in consumption and optimal taxation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 687-707.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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