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Technology Transfers and the Clean Development Mechanism in a North-South General Equilibrium Model

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Backlund, Kenneth

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Sahlén, Linda

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world economy comprising two regions, North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). As our model allows for labor mobility between the formal and informal sectors in the South, we are also able to capture additional aspects of how the transfer influences the Southern economy. In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement to an otherwise uncontrolled market economy, the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Backlund, Kenneth & Sahlén, Linda, 2006. "Technology Transfers and the Clean Development Mechanism in a North-South General Equilibrium Model," Umeå Economic Studies 697, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0697
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren, 2003. "Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2749-2764, December.
    2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    3. Thomas Aronsson & Thomas Jonsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2006. "International Environmental Policy Reforms, Tax Distortions, and the Labor Market," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(2), pages 199-217, June.
    4. Thomas Aronsson & Karl-Gustaf Löfgren & Kenneth Backlund, 2004. "Welfare Measurement in Imperfect Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2494.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate policy; technology transfer; Kyoto protocol; general equilibrium; clean development mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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