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Efficient Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Policy Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Sjögren, Tomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear taxation under right-to-manage wage formation, and we assume that the fall-back profit facing firms during wage bargaining depends on the profit they can obtain if moving production abroad. The purpose is to study how policy coordination among countries can be used to increase the welfare level in comparison with an uncoordinated equilibrium. We consider coordinated policy reforms with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2002. "Efficient Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Policy Coordination," Umeå Economic Studies 601, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0601
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    Cited by:

    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjogren, Tomas, 2004. "Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2711-2725, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; policy coordination; union wage setting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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