Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance
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References listed on IDEAS
- Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
- Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July.
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- Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," Cahiers de recherche 1420, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, Georges & Rothschild, Casey, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," Working Papers 14-4, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
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More about this item
Keywords
genetic testing;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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