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Taxation and Multi-Sided Platforms: A Review

Author

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  • Kind, Hans Jarle

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

Many of the largest and most influential industries in the global economy operate digitally as multi-sided platforms, catering to different groups who are connected through intergroup network effects. This paper provides a survey of the theoretical literature on the effects of taxing these firms via indirect and corporate taxes. It seeks to establish an understanding of why traditional insights from taxation in one-sided markets may not apply to firms in multi-sided markets. Indeed, governments risk implementing counterproductive tax policies in multi-sided markets if they base their strategies on what constitutes efficient taxation in traditional markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2024. "Taxation and Multi-Sided Platforms: A Review," Discussion Papers 2024/12, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2024_012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multisided platforms; taxation; imperfect competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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