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Tax Competition and Tax Co-Ordination Under Destination and Origin Principles: A Synthesis

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  • Lockwood, Ben

Abstract

This paper proposes a general framework for analysing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles, based on three possible tax spillovers, the consumer price spillover, the producer price/terms of trade spillover, and rent spillovers. A model is presented which can be extended to accommodate all three spillovers. Using this model, many of the results in the existing literature can be derived, compared, and extended.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "Tax Competition and Tax Co-Ordination Under Destination and Origin Principles: A Synthesis," Economic Research Papers 269338, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269338
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269338
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Russell Krelove, 1992. "Efficient Tax Exporting," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 145-155, February.
    2. Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March.
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    6. A. Bovenberg, 1994. "Destination- and origin-based taxation under international capital mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(3), pages 247-273, October.
    7. Søren Bo Nielsen, 2001. "A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross‐border Shopping," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 599-623, December.
    8. Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 449-489, Springer.
    9. Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel, 1998. "On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 185-193, August.
    10. Lockwood, Ben, 2001. "Tax competition and tax co-ordination under destination and origin principles: a synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 279-319, August.
    11. Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, "undated". "When is Policy Harmonisation Desirable?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    12. Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Can international commodity tax harmonisation be Pareto-improving when governments supply public goods?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 387-408, November.
    13. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January.
    14. Ben Lockwood & David Meza & Gareth Myles, 1994. "When are origin and destination regimes equivalent?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(1), pages 5-24, February.
    15. Grossman, Gene M., 1980. "Border tax adjustments: Do they distort trade?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 117-128, February.
    16. Venables, Anthony J., 1982. "Optimal tariffs for trade in monopolistically competitive commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3-4), pages 225-241, May.
    17. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
    18. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1998. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 323-350, August.
    19. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January.
    20. Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 1996. "The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 83-93, January.
    21. Whalley, John, 1979. "Uniform domestic tax rates, trade distortions and economic integration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 213-221, March.
    22. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    23. Georgakopoulos, T & Hitiris, T, 1992. "On the Superiority of the Destination over the Origin Principle of Taxation for Intra-union Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 117-126, January.
    24. Lockwood, Ben, 1993. "Commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 141-162, September.
    25. George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, 2019. "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 17, pages 525-542, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    26. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1993. "Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 55-74, May.
    27. repec:cor:louvrp:-895 is not listed on IDEAS
    28. Haufler, Andreas, 1998. "Asymmetric commodity tax competition -- comment on de Crombrugghe and Tulkens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 135-144, January.
    29. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1998. "Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 253-267, February.
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    31. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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