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Incentive Contracts for Managers Who Discover and Manage Investment Projects

Author

Listed:
  • Campbell, Tim

    (University of Southern California)

  • Marino, Tony

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Campbell, Tim & Marino, Tony, 1989. "Incentive Contracts for Managers Who Discover and Manage Investment Projects," Working Paper Series 208, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0208
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christensen, J, 1982. "The Determination Of Performance Standards And Participation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 589-603.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2014. "Status and incentives: A critical survey," MPRA Paper 57658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Eliasson, Gunnar, 1990. "Financial Institutions in a European Market for Executive Competence," Working Paper Series 265, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised May 1991.
    3. Kenneth Yung & Chen Chen, 2018. "Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1005-1032, November.
    4. Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2022. "Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 11(1), pages 95-115, June.
    5. Franklin G. Mixon Jr. & James B. Wilkinson, 1999. "Compensation Schemes and Human Capital Attainment in Congress: Is There an Adverse Selection of Legislator Attributes?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(4), pages 418-433, July.
    6. Barron, John M. & Waddell, Glen R., 2008. "Work hard, not smart: Stock options in executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 767-790, June.
    7. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive contracts; investment opportunities; innovation; uncertainty; manager ability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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