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Screening stringency in the disability insurance program

Author

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  • Johansson, Per

    (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)

  • Laun, Lisa

    (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)

  • Laun, Tobias

    (Department of Economics, Uppsala University)

Abstract

We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson, Per & Laun, Lisa & Laun, Tobias, 2013. "Screening stringency in the disability insurance program," Working Paper Series 2013:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2013_010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mathilde Godard, 2017. "Targeting disability insurance applications with screening," Post-Print halshs-01660800, HAL.
    2. Per Johansson & Lisa Laun & Mårten Palme, 2014. "Pathways to Retirement and the Role of Financial Incentives in Sweden," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement, pages 369-410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Benjamin Friedrich & Lisa Laun & Costas Meghir, 2022. "Earnings dynamics of immigrants and natives in Sweden 1985–2016," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(4), pages 1803-1847, November.
    4. Schreiner, Ragnhild C., 2019. "Unemployed or Disabled? Disability Screening and Labor Market Outcomes of Youths," Memorandum 5/2019, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    5. Forslund, Anders, 2019. "Employment outcomes and policies in Sweden during recent decades," Working Paper Series 2019:15, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    6. Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Arnau Juanmarti Mestres & Judit Vall Castello, 2017. "Hiring subsidies for people with disabilities: Do they work?," Policy Papers 2017-11, FEDEA.
    7. Werner Eichhorst & Tito Boeri & An De Coen & Vincenzo Galasso & Michael Kendzia & Nadia Steiber, 2014. "How to combine the entry of young people in the labour market with the retention of older workers?," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    8. Mathilde Godard & Pierre Koning & Maarten Lindeboom, 2024. "Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 59(5), pages 1353-1386.
    9. Werner Eichhorst & Tito Boeri & Michela Braga & An de Coen & Galasso Vicenzo & Maarten Gerard & Michael J. Kendzia & Christine Mayrhuber & Jakob Louis Pedersen & Ricarda Schmidl & Nadia Steiber, 2013. "Combining the Entry of Young People in the Labour Market with the Retention of Older Workers," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 46988, January.
    10. Koning Pierre & Vethaak Heike, 2021. "Decomposing Employment Trends of Disabled Workers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(4), pages 1217-1255, October.
    11. Tobias Laun & Johanna Wallenius, 2016. "Social Insurance and Retirement: A Cross-Country Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 22, pages 72-92, October.
    12. Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Arnau Juanmartí Mestres & Judit Vall Castelló, 2019. "Hiring subsidies for people with a disability: do they work?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(5), pages 669-689, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disability insurance; screening stringency; proportional hazard model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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