A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995.
"Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1997.
"Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 547-581, June.
- Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1995. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 1107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992.
"Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
- Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murphy, K.J. & Gibbons, R., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence," Papers 90-09, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Effinger, Matthias R. & Polborn, Mattias K., 2001. "Herding and anti-herding: A model of reputational differentiation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 385-403, March.
- Trueman, Brett, 1994. "Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 97-124.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Luís Almeida Costa & Luís Vasconcelos, 2010.
"Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 259-301, June.
- Luis Almeida Costa e & Luis Vasconcelos, 2008. "Share the fame or share the blame? The reputational implications of partnerships," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp539, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
- Guillermo Ordoñez, 2013. "Reputation from nested activities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 915-940, April.
- Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002250, David K. Levine.
- Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2020. "A Master of Two Servants: The Effect of Separation of Powers on Public Accountability and Social Welfare," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 10612466, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "Scapegoats and Transparency in Organizations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 407, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Konishi, Hideki, 2006. "Spending cuts or tax increases? The composition of fiscal adjustments as a signal," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1441-1469, August.
- Kwang-ho Kim, 2013. "A Drawback of Political Accountability," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 405-428.
- Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000.
"Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2001. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," Economic Research Papers 269353, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Martinez, Leonardo, 2009.
"A theory of political cycles,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
- Leonardo Martinez, 2008. "A theory of political cycles," Working Paper 05-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Mr. Eric Le Borgne & Mr. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," IMF Working Papers 2002/048, International Monetary Fund.
- Vergne, Clémence, 2009.
"Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 63-77, March.
- Clémence VERGNE, 2006. "Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries," Working Papers 200608, CERDI.
- Clémence Vergne, 2011. "Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries," Working Papers halshs-00564572, HAL.
- Arnaud Dellis, 2009. "The Salient Issue of Issue Salience," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 203-231, April.
- Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007.
"Fiscal restraints and voter welfare,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April.
- Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2005. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3769, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Dhami, Sanjit, 2003.
"The political economy of redistribution under asymmetric information,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2069-2103, September.
- Sanjit Dhami, 2001. "The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 0108001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Joseph J. Capuno & Stella A. Quimbo & Aleli D. Kraft & Carlos Antonio R. Tan, Jr. & Vigile Marie B. Fabella, 2012. "Perks and public provisions : Effects of yardstick competition on local government fiscal behavior in the Philippines," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201208, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2016. "The cost of doing the right thing. A model of populism with rent-seeking politicians and the economic crisis," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis1602, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
- Bernardo P. Schettini & Rafael Terra, 2020. "Electoral incentives and Public Employees’ Retirement Systems in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 79-103, July.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013.
"Term limits and electoral accountability,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
- Sturm, Daniel & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46860, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEP Discussion Papers dp0770, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2006. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19771, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2015. "Lame but loyal ducks," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007.
"Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1228, CESifo.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
- Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
- Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Snyder Jr., James M. & Ting, Michael M., 2008. "Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 482-500, April.
- Kausik Chaudhuri & Sugato Dasgupta, 2005. "The political determinants of central governments' economic policies in India: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 957-978.
More about this item
Keywords
Separating equilibrium; competence; co-worker; blame; scapegoat;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Helena Lundin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erhhsse.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.