THE PROBLEM OF TRADING PATENTS IN ORGANIZED MARKETS: A dynamic experimental microeconomic system model and informal price theory
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- Ullberg, Eskil, 2010. "The problem of trading patents in organized markets: A dynamic experimental microeconomic system model and informal price theory," JIBS Working Papers 2010-15, Jönköping International Business School.
- Eskil Ullberg, 2010. "The Problem of Trading Patents in Organized Markets: A Dynamic Experimental Microeconomic System Model and Informal Price Theory," Working Papers 1016, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
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Cited by:
- Eskil Ullberg, 2017. "Coordination of Inventions and Innovations Through Patent Markets with Prices," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 8(2), pages 704-738, June.
- Ullberg, Eskil, 2015. "Coordination of Inventions and Innovations through patent markets with prices," Ratio Working Papers 260, The Ratio Institute.
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More about this item
Keywords
patents; organized markets; trade; licensing; technology;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2010-11-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-INO-2010-11-13 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2010-11-13 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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