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A Welfarist Role for Nonwelfarist Rules: An example with envy

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  • Matthew C. Weinzierl

    (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit)

Abstract

I propose and formalize an argument for why economists working in the welfarist normative tradition should include nonwelfarist principles in how they judge economic policy. The key idea behind this argument is that the world is too complex, and our ability to model it too limited, for us to fully trace a policy's effects on welfare. Nonwelfarist principles can be valuable to a welfarist facing this limitation if they act as informational proxies, carrying accumulated knowledge about the effects of policy that otherwise cannot be considered. This argument can be seen both as extending a familiar logic for rule utilitarianism beyond the realm of individual ethics and as a specific version of a broader argument made for centuries by theorists from Hume to Hayek. I also provide evidence of an example in which real-world policy judgments are consistent with this theoretical argument. Results from a novel U.S. opinion survey show that approximately half of respondents reject redistribution driven by envy even though it generates direct utilitarian gains. That share rises as the role of envy is made more salient, consistent with respondents using nonwelfarist principles to encode concerns about the unobservable consequences of policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2016. "A Welfarist Role for Nonwelfarist Rules: An example with envy," Harvard Business School Working Papers 17-021, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:17-021
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Aronsson & Sugata Ghosh & Ronald Wendner, 2023. "Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 311-337, August.
    2. Erik Schokkaert & Benoît Tarroux, 2021. "Empirical research on ethical preferences: how popular is prioritarianism?," Working Papers halshs-03110312, HAL.
    3. Flaviana Palmisano, 2024. "Compassion and envy in distributional comparisons," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 153-184, February.
    4. Robert Scherf & Matthew Weinzierl, 2020. "Understanding Different Approaches to Benefit‐Based Taxation," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 385-410, June.
    5. Weinzierl, Matthew, 2017. "Popular acceptance of inequality due to innate brute luck and support for classical benefit-based taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 54-63.
    6. Bastian, Jacob E. & Jones, Maggie R., 2021. "Do EITC expansions pay for themselves? Effects on tax revenue and government transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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