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Self-Interest: The Economist’s Straitjacket

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  • Robert Simons

    (Harvard Business School, Accounting and Management Unit)

Abstract

This paper examines contemporary economic theories that focus on the design and management of business organizations. In the first part of the paper, a taxonomy is presented that describes the different types of economists interested in this subject-market economists, regulatory economists, macro economists, and enlightened economists-and illustrates the extent to which each tribe has been captured by the concept of self-interest. After arguing that this fixation has caused-and is likely to continue to cause-significant harm to our economy, the paper then presents an alternative approach based on a theory of business and discusses the implications for research and public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Simons, 2015. "Self-Interest: The Economist’s Straitjacket," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-045, Harvard Business School, revised Jan 2019.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-045
    as

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    File URL: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=16-045.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Braithwaite,John & Drahos,Peter, 2000. "Global Business Regulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521784993, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-interest; economists; moral philosophers; agency theory; regulation; capture; organization design; economic theory; organization theory; management theory; business education; competition; customers; commitment; controls; boundaries.;
    All these keywords.

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