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The Cost of Property Rights: Establishing Institutions on the Philippine Frontier Under American Rule, 1898-1918

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  • Lakshmi Iyer

    (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit)

  • Noel Maurer

    (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit)

Abstract

We examine three reforms to property rights introduced by the United States in the Philippines in the early 20th century: the redistribution of large estates to their tenants, the creation of a system of secure land titles, and a homestead program to encourage cultivation of public lands. During the first phase of American occupation (1898-1918), we find that the implementation of these reforms was very slow. As a consequence, tenure insecurity increased over this period, and the distribution of farm sizes remained extremely unequal. We identify two primary causes for the slow progress of reform. The first was the high cost of implementing these programs, together with political constraints which prevented the government from subsidizing land reforms to a greater degree. The second was the reluctance of the government to evict delinquent or informal cultivators, especially on public lands, which reduced the costs of tenure insecurity.

Suggested Citation

  • Lakshmi Iyer & Noel Maurer, 2008. "The Cost of Property Rights: Establishing Institutions on the Philippine Frontier Under American Rule, 1898-1918," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-023, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Benito Arruñada, 2017. "How to Make Land Titling more Rational," Working Papers 983, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Denis Cogneau & Léa Rouanet, 2009. "Living Conditions in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Western Africa 1925-1985: What Do Survey Data on Height Stature Tell Us?," Working Papers DT/2009/12, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    3. Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Deininger, Klaus & Goldstein, Markus, 2014. "Environmental and gender impacts of land tenure regularization in Africa: Pilot evidence from Rwanda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 262-275.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4300 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Prince Christian Cruz, 2014. "The Spanish Origins of Extractive Institutions in the Philippines," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 54(1), pages 62-82, March.
    6. Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Deininger, Klaus & Mahofa, Godfrey & Nyakulama, Rhona, 2021. "Sustaining land registration benefits by addressing the challenges of reversion to informality in Rwanda," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    7. Williamson, Jeffrey G., 2017. "Philippine Inequality across the Twentieth Century: Slim Evidence but Fat Questions," CEPR Discussion Papers 12481, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N55 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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