IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-03350725.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Have European Banks left tax haven? Evidence from country-by-country data

Author

Listed:
  • Giulia Aliprandi

    (EU Tax - EU Tax Observatory, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Mona Baraké

    (EU Tax - EU Tax Observatory)

  • Paul-Emmanuel Chouc

    (EU Tax - EU Tax Observatory)

Abstract

This study documents the activity of European banks in tax havens and how this activity has evolved since 2014. The analysis covers 36 systemic European banks that have been required to publicly report country-by-country data on their activities since 2015. We study the level and evolution of the profits booked by these banks in tax havens over the 2014-2020 period. We also compute their effective tax rates and their tax deficit—defined as the difference between what these banks currently pay in taxes and what they would pay if they were subject to a minimum effective tax rate in each country. We start by creating a list of tax haven jurisdictions used by the banking sector. We combine two indicators to identify tax havens: the effective tax rate on bank profit and the amount of bank profit per employee. Overall, 17 jurisdictions feature in our list: Bahamas, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Mauritius, Panama, and Qatar. Using this list, we show that European banks use tax havens significantly, with no trend during the 2014–2020 period. The main European banks book EUR 20 billion (or 14% of their total profits) in tax havens each year. This percentage has been stable since 2014 despite the introduction of mandatory information disclosure. Bank profitability in tax havens is abnormally high: EUR 238 000 per employee, as opposed to around EUR 65 000 in non-haven countries. This suggests that the profits booked in tax havens are primarily shifted out of other countries where service production occurs. Around 25% of the profits made by the European banks in our sample are booked in countries with an effective tax rate lower than 15%. The use of tax havens varies considerably from bank to bank. The mean percentage of profits booked in tax havens is about 20% and ranges from 0% for nine banks to a maximum of 58%. The mean effective tax rate paid by the banks in our sample is 20%, with a minimum of 10% and a maximum of 30%. Seven banks exhibit a particularly low effective tax rate, below or equal to 15%. To better understand this heterogeneity, we analyse the use of tax havens by three banks with a relatively high presence in tax havens: HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and Société Générale. We observe a diversity of situations: for HSBC, the bulk of haven profits come from just one haven (Hong Kong), while in other cases multiple tax havens are involved. We estimate the amount of revenues that could be collected by applying a minimum tax rate on the profits of banks. We simulate a tax similar to the G20/OECD minimum tax proposal ,which the majority of the Inclusive Framework jurisdictions supported in July 2021. In this proposal each parent country would collect the tax deficit of its own banks. For instance, if the internationally agreed minimum tax rate is 15% and a German multinational bank has an effective tax rate of 10% on the profits it books in Singapore, Germany would impose an additional tax of 5% on these profits to arrive at an effective rate of 15%. We consider three minimum tax rates—15%, 21%, and 25%—and in each case compute the extra tax owed per bank and tabulate results by headquarter country. Our findings show that a minimum tax has significant revenue potential. With a 25% minimum tax rate, our sample of European banks would have to pay EUR 10-13 billion in additional taxes annually. Lower tax rates reduce the gains to EUR 6-9 billion for the 21% tax rate and EUR 3-5 billion for the 15% tax rate. Banks with low effective tax rates—which tend to make use of tax havens to shift profits and lower their tax liability—would be particularly affected. Our findings illustrate the usefulness of country-by-country reporting, a vital piece of information to track profit shifting and corporate tax avoidance. They also suggest that despite the growing salience of these issues in the public debate and in the policy world, European banks have not significantly curtailed their use of tax havens since 2014. More ambitious initiatives—such as a global minimum tax with a 25% rate—may be necessary to curb the use of tax havens by the banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Giulia Aliprandi & Mona Baraké & Paul-Emmanuel Chouc, 2021. "Have European Banks left tax haven? Evidence from country-by-country data," Working Papers halshs-03350725, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03350725
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03350725
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03350725/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petr Janský, 2020. "European banks and tax havens: evidence from country-by-country reporting," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(54), pages 5967-5985, November.
    2. Dutt, Verena K. & Nicolay, Katharina & Vay, Heiko & Voget, Johannes, 2019. "Can European banks' country-by-country reports reveal profit shifting? An analysis of the information content of EU banks' disclosures," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-042, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Vincent Bouvatier & Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Anne-Laure Delatte, 2017. "Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens," Working Papers 2017-16, CEPII research center.
    4. Fatica, Serena & Gregori, Wildmer Daniel, 2020. "How much profit shifting do European banks do?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 536-551.
    5. James R. Hines & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(1), pages 149-182.
    6. Peter Horvát & Colin Webb, 2020. "The OECD STAN Database for industrial analysis: Sources and methods," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2020/10, OECD Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hackett, Franki & Janský, Petr, 2023. "Incremental improvement: Evaluating the emancipatory impact of public country-by-country reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Müller, Raphael & Spengel, Christoph & Vay, Heiko, 2020. "On the determinants and effects of corporate tax transparency: Review of an emerging literature," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Dutt, Verena K. & Nicolay, Katharina & Spengel, Christoph, 2021. "Reporting behavior and transparency in European banks' country-by-country reports," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-019, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Dutt, Verena & Spengel, Christoph & Vay, Heiko, 2021. "Der EU-Vorschlag zum Country-by-Country Reporting im Internet: Kosten, Nutzen, Konsequenzen," Studien, Stiftung Familienunternehmen / Foundation for Family Businesses, number 250010.
    4. Sarah Godar & Giulia Aliprandi & Tommaso Faccio & Petr Janský & Katia Toledo Ruiz, 2024. "The long way to tax transparency: lessons from the early publishers of country-by-country reports," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(2), pages 593-634, April.
    5. Dutt, Verena K. & Spengel, Christoph & Vay, Heiko, 2021. "The EU proposal for country-by-country reporting on the internet: Costs, Benefits and Consequences," Studien, Stiftung Familienunternehmen / Foundation for Family Businesses, number 250025.
    6. Dutt, Verena K. & Nicolay, Katharina & Vay, Heiko & Voget, Johannes, 2019. "Can European banks' country-by-country reports reveal profit shifting? An analysis of the information content of EU banks' disclosures," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-042, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Vincent Bouvatier & Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Anne-Laure Delatte, 2017. "Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens," Working Papers 2017-16, CEPII research center.
    8. Murphy Richard & Janský Petr & Shah Atul, 2019. "BEPS Policy Failure—The Case of EU Country-By-Country Reporting," Nordic Tax Journal, Sciendo, vol. 2019(1), pages 63-86, January.
    9. Yahaya, Mohammed Baba & Oon, Elaine Yen Nee & Jusoh, Ruzita, 2024. "CEO Duality and Bank Tax Avoidance: The Moderating Role of Risk Committees - An International Evidence," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 74(1), pages 73-104.
    10. Mona Barake, 2023. "Tax Planning by European Banks," Working Papers halshs-03925346, HAL.
    11. Fatica, Serena & Gregori, Wildmer, 2018. "Profit shifting by EU banks: evidence from country-by-country reporting," JRC Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2018-04, Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
    12. Hackett, Franki & Janský, Petr, 2023. "Incremental improvement: Evaluating the emancipatory impact of public country-by-country reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    13. Javier Garcia-Bernardo & Petr Janský & Thomas Tørsløv, 2021. "Multinational corporations and tax havens: evidence from country-by-country reporting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(6), pages 1519-1561, December.
    14. Damioli, Giacomo & Gregori, Wildmer Daniel, 2023. "Diplomatic relations and cross-border investments in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    15. Petr Procházka, 2020. "Jurisdictions with lowest effective tax rates in the post-BEPS landscape - CbCR evidence and implications," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2020(1), pages 33-52.
    16. Vincent Vicard, 2019. "The Exorbitant Privilege of High Tax Countries," Working Papers 2019-06, CEPII research center.
    17. Vincent Vicard, 2023. "Profit Shifting, Returns on Foreign Direct Investments and Investment Income Imbalances," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 71(2), pages 369-414, June.
    18. Nerudova, Danuse & Dobranschi, Marian & Solilová, Veronika & Litzman, Marek, 2023. "Onshore and offshore profit shifting and tax revenue losses in the European Union," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    19. Menkhoff, Lukas & Miethe, Jakob, 2019. "Tax evasion in new disguise? Examining tax havens' international bank deposits," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 176, pages 53-78.
    20. Ji Seon Yoo & Ye Ji Lee, 2019. "National Culture and Tax Avoidance of Multinational Corporations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-28, December.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03350725. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.