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The political economy of non-tariff measures

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  • Cristina Herghelegiu

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Over the last decades, non-tari measures (NTMs) have seen an important upsurge. How- ever, little research has focused on the political economy of non-tariff protection, and the existing studies are mainly based on a single country or a specific type of measures. This paper seeks to fill the gap by empirically evaluating the determinants of NTMs in several countries, both developed and developing. Overall results show certain protectionist purposes behind the adoption of NTMs. This conclusion is reinforced for restrictive measures (i.e. subject to trade concerns), but does not hold for non-restrictive measures, suggesting the legitimate goal of several NTMs. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the influence exerted by national business groups during the Ministerial Conferences - the highest authority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - increases the probability of adopting NTMs in both developed and developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Herghelegiu, 2017. "The political economy of non-tariff measures," Working Papers halshs-01385423, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01385423
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01385423v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stender, Frederik & Vogel, Tim, 2021. "Murky trade waters: Regional tariff commitments and non-tariff measures in Africa," IDOS Discussion Papers 13/2021, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

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    Keywords

    Political Economy; International Trade; Non-tariff Measures; Lobbying;
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