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International labour standards and product differentiation

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  • Michela Limardi

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Limardi, 2008. "International labour standards and product differentiation," Working Papers halshs-00586062, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586062
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00586062
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    References listed on IDEAS

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