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The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection

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  • Eric Kamwa

    (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles)

Abstract

In committee selection setting, we introduce the Condorcet Loser Committee (CLC) which when it exists, is a committee such that each of its members is defeated in pairwise comparisons by any outside candidate. It turns out that most popular committee selection rules can elect the CLC when it exists. From the perspective of the Condorcet majority criterion, the election of the CLC is simply not acceptable. We identify the few rules that will never elect the CLC when it exists. We show among others that the k-Borda rule is the only k-scoring committee rule that never select the CLC. This also holds with k-iterative Borda rule, Nanson rule, Kemeny rule, Copeland rule. As a corollary, it appeared that the Chamberlin-Courant rule can elect the CLC when it exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Kamwa, 2022. "The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection," Working Papers hal-03880064, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03880064
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03880064
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    2. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
    3. Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.
    4. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    5. Nicolaus Tideman & Daniel Richardson, 2000. "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 13-34, April.
    6. Skowron, Piotr & Faliszewski, Piotr & Slinko, Arkadii, 2019. "Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 244-273.
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    12. Chamberlin, John R. & Courant, Paul N., 1983. "Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 718-733, September.
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    Keywords

    Committee; Condorcet; Scoring; Borda;
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