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Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model

Author

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  • Damien Besancenot

    (LIRAES - EA 4470 - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5)

  • Radu Vranceanu

    (ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) - ESSEC Business School - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the profit of the platform.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2018. "Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model," Working Papers hal-01718793, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01718793
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-01718793
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurship; Global games; Overenthusiasm; Behavioral IO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G41 - Financial Economics - - Behavioral Finance - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making in Financial Markets
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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