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Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection

Author

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  • Pierre Picard

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

We characterize the design of insurance schemes when policyhold- ers face several insurable risks in a context of adverse selection. Split- ting risks emerges as a feature of second-best Pareto-optimal alloca- tions. This may take the form of risk-speci c contracts, or of con- tracts where risks are bundled, but subject to di⁄erential coverage rules such as risk speci c copayments, combined with a deductible, an out-of-pocket maximum or a cap on coverage.

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  • Pierre Picard, 2017. "Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-01448322, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01448322
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01448322v4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Chi, Yichun & Zhuang, Sheng Chao, 2022. "Regret-based optimal insurance design," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 22-41.
    3. Olga I. Vikarchuk & Serhii M. Nikolaienko & Olena O. Kalinichenko & Iryna O. Poita, 2020. "Integrated evaluation as a precedence of economic security management insurance market," RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA SOSTENIBILITA', FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(2 suppl.), pages 157-171.

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    Keywords

    deductible; copayment; contract; adverse selection; Insurance; health insurance;
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