IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/genrir/v22y1997i2p81-101.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Fluet

    (Département des Sciences Économiques, University of Quebec at Montreal, P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3P8.)

  • François Pannequin

    (2École Nationale Supérieure (Cachan) and GRID)

Abstract

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1997) 22, 81–101. doi:10.1023/A:1008659916387

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Fluet & François Pannequin, 1997. "Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 81-101, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:22:y:1997:i:2:p:81-101
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v22/n2/pdf/grir199792a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v22/n2/full/grir199792a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    3. Daniela Elena Marinescu & Ioana Manafi & Dumitru Marin, 2012. "An Adverse Selection Model with Finite Number of Types and Informational Rents," International Journal of Economic Practices and Theories, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2(3), pages 99-108, July.
    4. Hao Zheng & Yi Yao & Yinglu Deng & Feng Gao, 2022. "Information asymmetry, ex ante moral hazard, and uninsurable risk in liability coverage: Evidence from China's automobile insurance market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(1), pages 131-160, March.
    5. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2008. "On Bundling in Insurance Markets," Vienna Economics Papers 0809, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    6. Pierre Picard, 2020. "Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 997-1033, December.
    7. Laux, Christian, 2008. "Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/54, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    8. Liang Hong & Harris Schlesinger & Boyi Zhuang, 2023. "Whoops! It Happened Again: Demand for Insurance That Covers Multiple Risks," Risks, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-17, April.
    9. M. Martin Boyer & Franca Glenzer, 2021. "Pensions, annuities, and long-term care insurance: on the impact of risk screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 46(2), pages 133-174, September.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5370 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. De La Mata, Dolores & Olivella, Pau & Valdés, Maria Nieves, 2022. "Asymmetric Information with multiple risks: the case of the Chilean Private Health Insurance Market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 35441, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    12. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    13. Cong Tam Trinh & Xuan Nguyen & Pasquale Sgro, 2021. "Culture and the demand for non‐life insurance: Empirical evidences from middle‐income and high‐income economies," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(3), pages 431-458, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:22:y:1997:i:2:p:81-101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.