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Antidumping Laws and Developing Countries

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  • Patrick Messerlin

    (GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

This paper finds that the current GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) consistent antidumping laws have a strong protectionist drift and a procartel bias. They endanger the very edifice of the international trade system based on GATT rules. LDCs (Less Developed Countries) and NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) are deeply involved in antidumping actions, both as defendants and as prosecutors. They are hurt not only by antidumping actions initiated by other countries but also by their own antidumping laws, which may jeopardize their trade liberalization programs. LDCs and NICs should play an active role in reforming GATT rules to reduce the GATT bias in favor of"injured industries"that compete for imports and to make GATT rules conform more to their ongoing trade liberalization programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Messerlin, 1988. "Antidumping Laws and Developing Countries," Working Papers hal-01064775, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01064775
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01064775
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dixit, Avinash, 1988. "Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, January.
    2. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alfred Tovias, 1991. "EC‐Eastern Europe: A Case Study of Hungary," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 291-315, March.
    2. Chong-Hyun Nam, 1993. "Protectionist U.S. Trade Policy and Korean Exports," NBER Chapters, in: Trade and Protectionism, pages 183-222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Michael W. S. Davenport, 1990. "The External Policy of the Community and its Effects upon the Manufactured Exports of the Developing Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 181-200, December.
    4. Sam Laird, 1999. "Export policy and the WTO," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 73-88.
    5. Julio Noguks, 1991. "Less-Than-Fair Trade Cases Against Latin-American Countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 475-491, December.
    6. Laird, Samuel, 1992. "Non-tariff measures in hemispheric FTA negotiations," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 33909, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    7. Laird, Sam, 1997. "WTO rules and good practice on export policy," WTO Staff Working Papers TPRD-97-01, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    8. Auboin, Marc & Laird, Sam, 1998. "EU import measures and the developing countries," WTO Staff Working Papers TPRD-98-01, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.

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