IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-00515244.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Changements institutionnels et efficience de l'affrètement au voyage dans le transport fluvial de marchandises

Author

Listed:
  • Emeric Lendjel

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marianne Fischman

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

VNF (2010)'s statistical data show a remarkable resilience of inland navigation in France during the recession. Yet at least part of the profession is in crisis: the boatmen are now likely to be close to bankruptcy. Key players in the fully liberalized (since 2000) spot market, small independent barge owners bear the brunt of lower prices resulting from a destructive competition exacerbated in times of recession. Transaction costs associated with this new institutional environment exacerbate this pro-cyclical behavior detrimental to the entire profession. With the help of transaction costs economics, the article assesses the conditions of efficiency of voyage charter in the spot market before and after the abolition of the "Tour de rôle" and lead to recommendations to improve organization and efficiency of this market segment.

Suggested Citation

  • Emeric Lendjel & Marianne Fischman, 2010. "Changements institutionnels et efficience de l'affrètement au voyage dans le transport fluvial de marchandises," Working Papers hal-00515244, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00515244
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00515244
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00515244/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Tadelis & Oliver E.Williamson, 2012. "Transaction Cost Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    2. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814904, October.
    3. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1993. "Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 937-976, October.
    4. Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-486, April.
    5. Scott E. Masten & Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "Econometrics of Contracts : an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 215-236.
    6. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521893138, October.
    7. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    8. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    9. Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-365, June.
    10. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Emeric Lendjel & Marianne Fischman, 2010. "Changements institutionnels et efficience de l'affrètement au voyage dans le transport fluvial de marchandises," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00515244, HAL.
    2. Emeric Lendjel & Marianne Fischman, 2014. "Les Structures De Gouvernances De La Chaine Transactionnelle Du Transport Fluvial De Conteneurs Sur Le Rhone," Post-Print halshs-00741130, HAL.
    3. Emeric Lendjel, 2013. "Le transport fluvial de vrac," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00977964, HAL.
    4. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    5. Haucap, Justus, 2017. "The rule of law and the emergence of market exchange: A new institutional economic perspective," DICE Discussion Papers 276, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    6. Blaeschke, Frédéric & Haug, Peter, 2014. "Does Intermunicipal Cooperation Increase Efficiency? Evidence from the Hessian Wastewater Sector," IWH Discussion Papers 11/2014, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    7. Eric Brousseau & Jean-Marie Codron, 1998. "La complémentarité entre formes de gouvernance [Le cas de l'approvisionnement des grandes surfaces en fruits de contre saison]," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 245(1), pages 75-83.
    8. Michael E. Sykuta, 2010. "Empirical Methods in Transaction Cost Economics," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2007. "Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6163-6187, December.
    10. Bhimani, Alnoor & Lopes, Alexsandro & De Aquino, Andre Carlos Busanelli, 2017. "Measurement costs and control in outsourcing relationships," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68615, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Finon, Dominique & Perez, Yannick, 2007. "The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of renewable energies: A transaction-cost perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, April.
    12. Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(4), pages 811-836, August.
    13. Martino, Gaetano, 2010. "Trust, contracting, and adaptation in agri-food hybrid structure," MPRA Paper 37617, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
    15. Herbert Hovenkamp, 2011. "Coasean markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 63-90, February.
    16. Averyt, William F. & Ramagopal, K., 1999. "Strategic disruption and transaction cost economics: The case of the American auto industry and Japanese competition," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 39-53, January.
    17. Sylvain Rossiaud, 2015. "L’ouverture de l’amont pétrolier à des compagnies privées. Un cadre d’analyse en termes d’économie des coûts de transaction," Post-Print hal-01162793, HAL.
    18. Susan Velasco Portillo, 2015. "El agotamiento del régimen fordista boliviano y la financiarización de YPFB," Revista Lebret, Universidad Santo Tomás - Bucaramanga, vol. 7, pages 308-325, December.
    19. Andersson, Thomas, 1991. "Approaches to Partnerships Causing Asymmetries Between Japan and the West," Working Paper Series 320, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1992.
    20. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2009. "Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 311-332, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00515244. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.