Fritz John's Equation in Mechanism Design
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- Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Implementability; Mechanism design; John's equation; Kevin Roberts' theorem;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2023-02-20 (Economic Design)
- NEP-HIS-2023-02-20 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2023-02-20 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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