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Do French companies under-report their workforce at 49 employees to get around the law?

Author

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  • Philippe Askenazy

    (CMH - Centre Maurice Halbwachs - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Département de Sciences sociales ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Thomas Breda

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

  • Flavien Moreau

    (FMI - Fond Monétaire International - FMI)

  • Vladimir Pecheu

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Various legal obligations in terms of social dialogue, profit sharing and accounting apply to French companies when they reach the threshold of 50 employees. This policy brief shows that a significant proportion of companies voluntarily under-report their workforce below this threshold and this allows them to avoid their obligations. Compliance with the law in terms of social dialogue or profit-sharing thus appears to be linked to the number of employees that companies declare and not to their actual workforce. These results illustrate how the labor code can be circumvented in a complex regulatory environment and in the absence of sufficient means of oversight. They invite reflection on the use of more direct and effective methods of monitoring compliance with the law. They also invite caution in considering the results of several recent studies that quantify the cost of legal obligations at the 50-employee threshold, assuming that they are fully respected in practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Askenazy & Thomas Breda & Flavien Moreau & Vladimir Pecheu, 2022. "Do French companies under-report their workforce at 49 employees to get around the law?," PSE Working Papers halshs-03828729, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03828729
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03828729
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luis Garicano & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3439-3479, November.
    2. Philippe Aghion & Antonin Bergeaud & John Van Reenen, 2023. "The Impact of Regulation on Innovation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(11), pages 2894-2936, November.
    3. Philippe Aghion, 2021. "The impact of regulation on innovation," CentrePiece - The magazine for economic performance 607, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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