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Vanishing leadership and declining reciprocity in a sequential contribution experiment

Author

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  • Charles Figuieres

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • David Masclet

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Marc Willinger

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round ("sequential treatment with information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds, but cannot observe earlier contributions ("sequential treatment without information"). We also investigate whether average contributions are affected by the length of the sequence by varying group size. Our results show that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions, but that the level of contributions increases when subjects are informed about the contributions of lower-ranked subjects. We provide evidence that the so-called "leadership effect" vanishes within rounds, and that group size has no significant impact on the average level of contributions in our sequential contribution games.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Figuieres & David Masclet & Marc Willinger, 2012. "Vanishing leadership and declining reciprocity in a sequential contribution experiment," Post-Print halshs-00658740, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00658740
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00415.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphaële Préget & Phu Nguyen-Van & Marc Willinger, 2016. "Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 581-599, November.
    2. Béatrice BOULU-RESHEF & Nina RAPOPORT, "undated". "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2824, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    3. Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Nina Rapoport, 2020. "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20023, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
    5. Gerald Eisenkopf & Torben Kölpin, 2023. "Leadership and cooperation in growing teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 273-299, April.
    6. Vyrastekova, Jana & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2018. "Cooperation in a sequential dilemma game: How much transparency is good for cooperation?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 88-95.
    7. Chen, Yan & Li, Sherry Xin & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Shih, Margaret, 2014. "Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 58-86.
    8. Drouvelis, Michalis & Pearce, Graeme, 2023. "Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    9. Billinger, Stephan & Rosenbaum, Stephen Mark, 2023. "On the limits of hierarchy in public goods games: A survey and meta-analysis on the effects of design variables on cooperation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    10. van Winden, Frans, 2015. "Political economy with affect: On the role of emotions and relationships in political economics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 298-311.
    11. Drouvelis, Michalis & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2013. "Group identity and leading-by-example," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 414-425.
    12. Heim, Réka & Huber, Jürgen, 2019. "Leading-by-example and third-party punishment: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).

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    Keywords

    sequential contribution experiment;

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