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Is this all "Greek" in Europe ? Critical evaluation of the Euro zone policy response to debt crises

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  • Shazia Ghani

    (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2)

Abstract

Eurozone is going though the worst ever crises since the adoption of the common currency in 1999. In the aftermath of financial crises of 2007, many EU government due to their own fragile banking system and imbalance economic structures persued a debt-spending financing which resulted into a full-fledged sovereign debt crises .Though indebtedness increased in all members of the union to over come the recession but some states become more vulnerable. EU tried different measures to check the contagion but lack of an adequate institutional setup, poor coordination and the absence of a permanent mechanism to cope with such crises made the situation more worst. Many options have tried so far to get out of the mess but these have failed to address the underlying cusses of the catastrophe. The systemic policy failure has not only exposed the union to the risks of breakup but also render the future of Euro as a reserve currency more uncertain. Nevertheless, the challenge in the current situation demands a very well carved policy which ensures the integration of the union and stability of the Euro as the reserve currency. This challenging situation underpins the necessity to move further with a strong political will. Improving the euro area's fiscal woe by a balanced economic growth and overhaul of the regulatory architecture are the few areas calls for the serious attention of authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Shazia Ghani, 2011. "Is this all "Greek" in Europe ? Critical evaluation of the Euro zone policy response to debt crises," Post-Print halshs-00638723, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00638723
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00638723
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    References listed on IDEAS

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