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Les Comités De Rémunération Et De Sélection Sont-Ils Perçus Comme Des Mécanismes De Contrôle En France ?

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  • Charles Piot

    (CEROM - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche sur les Organisations et le Management - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)

Abstract

Cette étude aborde les déterminants de l'existence et de l'indépendance managériale, dans les grandes sociétés françaises, des comités de rémunération et de sélection des administrateurs et des mandataires sociaux. Les hypothèses relèvent du cadre théorique de l'agence, dans lequel l'opportunisme managérial justifie la mise en oeuvre de mécanismes disciplinaires efficaces. L'échantillon est composé des groupes non financiers du SBF 120, observés sur la période 1999-2001. Les analyses logistiques suggèrent que l'existence des comités de rémunération répond effectivement à une demande d'encadrement de la relation d'agence actionnaires-dirigeants. Cette relation est beaucoup plus faible pour les comités de sélection, et l'actionnariat managérial n'explique pas non plus le fait que ces deux types de comités soient exempts de cadres dirigeants.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Piot, 2005. "Les Comités De Rémunération Et De Sélection Sont-Ils Perçus Comme Des Mécanismes De Contrôle En France ?," Post-Print halshs-00581273, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00581273
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00581273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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