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Interdépendance des mécanismes de gouvernance : Etude empirique dans le contexte canadien

Author

Listed:
  • Paul André

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal)

  • Hanen Khemakhem

    (Ecole des sciences de la gestion - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Ouafa Sakka

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal)

Abstract

Le présent article traite de l'interdépendance entre trois mécanismes internes de contrôle des dirigeants, à savoir : la rémunération du dirigeant par des options, la propriété managériale et l'indépendance du conseil. Nous avons supposé que le recours de l'entreprise à l'un de ces mécanismes est fonction de l'utilisation des autres mécanismes. Pour tester cette hypothèse, nous avons utilisé un système d'équations simultanées solutionné moyennant la méthode du triple moindre carré. Nos résultats révèlent que les liens de causalité entre les trois mécanismes de gouvernance étudiés vont dans les deux sens suivants : de l'indépendance du conseil vers la rémunération du dirigeant par des options et de la rémunération du dirigeant par des options vers la propriété managériale dans le capital social. Ainsi, il n'existe pas de véritables liens réciproques entre les mécanismes d'intérêt. Plus particulièrement, l'indépendance du conseil ne semble par être déterminée par les deux autres mécanismes.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul André & Hanen Khemakhem & Ouafa Sakka, 2006. "Interdépendance des mécanismes de gouvernance : Etude empirique dans le contexte canadien," Post-Print halshs-00548055, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548055
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00548055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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